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BOOK REVIEWS
PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW. By Professor Rollin M. Perkins. Brooklyn, New
York: Foundation Press, Inc., 1957. Pp. xxviii, 999. $15.00 & $10.00.
Professor Rollin M. Perkins has written a comprehensive text book on criminal
law which covers not only the modern statutory criminal law, but includes a
detailed discussion of the common law as well.
Each of the chapters is introduced by describing the historical background and
explaining why the law has developed to its modern status. The author follows
this with a statement as to what the law is in various jurisdictions, frequently
concluding with a scholarly discussion as to why that is the law and the reasons
why it should or should not continue to be so. This not only makes for easy and
interesting reading, but it will cause the reader to review many of the citations
that are set out in the footnotes. For the student, in particular, this treatment
is very helpful. The volume follows the pattern of the author's case book, but
its value goes well beyond a student's requirements and would be a valuable
addition to any lawyer's library.
The many years of the author's experience as a professor of criminal law are
reflected in the scholarly presentation. However, on rare occasions he overlooks
the practical problems connected with the enforcement of criminal law. For in-
stance, in State v. Martin,' a case in which the defendant has thrown a glass tube
filled with acid at the driver's side of a taxicab, splattering acid on or near two
passengers, the court held that the specific intent was to injure the driver, not
the passengers, and that there could be no transfer of such intent to the pas-
sengers. In freeing the defendant the court mentioned, and Professor Perkins
emphasizes in his discussion of the case, that the prosecutor should have filed the
charge with the cab driver named as the victim. Any prosecutor with courtroom
experience would realize, however, that there are many practical reasons why an
innocent passenger would be a more appealing victim to a jury than the cab
driver. Some reasons could be that the labor dispute in which the driver was
involved might confuse the issues in the assault trial, or the driver might have
had a criminal record or some other background that could have adversely affected
the outcome. When a prosecutor elects to bring prosecution in such a situation,
the law should encourage him to select his strongest case. The failure of the
courts to give full protection of the law to innocent victims should not be ex-
plained away by accusing the prosecutor of failure to use diligence in drawing
the criminal information.
Many states have refused to follow the rule of the Martin case, and by judicial
interpretation of their statutes have allowed the required specific intent to be
transferred, thereby extending the protection of the law to the innocent victim as
well as the intended victim. The author wisely ends his discussion of transferred
intent with the statement: "There is no need for a statute to limit its application
by specificity of this nature and the tendency today is to omit any such restricting
terms."2
The author's definition and classification of the law of homicide is worth any
lauyer's reading time. His treatment of the statutory modifications to the common
1. 342 Mo. 1089, 119 S.W.2d 298 (1938). This decision is one of the leading
cases on the specific intent required by certain states in crimes such as assault
with intent to kill, rob, etc.
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law, and the reasons for these changes, gives the student and general practitioner
a ready grasp of the subject.
The subject of insanity in criminal cases is given very thorough and interesting
treatment. Discussion includes the M'Naghten rule (holding a defendant not
responsible for a criminal act if he had a defect of reason which prevented him
from knowing what he was doing, or from knowing the act was wrong), the
irresistible impulse rule, insane delusions, and the Durham case (holding that the
defendant must be acquitted if it is found that he had a mental disease, and that
his criminal act was the product of the mental disease or defect). Each of the
rules is discussed and illustrated so that even the neophyte should have little
difficulty in understanding the different rules and the reasons for them.
Discussion of criminal insanity, however, is not confined to a bare explanation
of the various tests for insanity in criminal cases. The author concludes this
section with a strong argument for committing and treating persons who, al-
though legally sane, are afflicted with mental defects or disorders. He insists
that, even if persons mentally ill are convicted (found legally sane), they should
be segregated from other prisoners and given therapeutic treatment. A point is
thereby made of the present inadequate handling of mentally disturbed people
who are not legally insane and, under our present practice, are committed to
penal institutions. While it obviously is vital that the public be protected from
mentally disturbed persons who commit criminal acts, it is essential that such
persons, even though legally sane, be given therapeutc treatment, looking towards
their complete recovery when that is medically attainable.
Professor Perkins seems to agree with the view of many psychiatrists that
oftentimes there are insane people who despite their afflictions can distinguish
right from wrong, and that therefore we should prepare ourselves for the im-
provement of the right and wrong test without throwing juries into complete
confusion. The present right and wrong test is a simple standard for the jury
to apply, but many psychiatrists feel this test is too simple-that it disregards
those who have serious mental disorders but who do know right from wrong.
Constant legislative enactment of new criminal statutes makes it imperative
that the lawyer be well grounded in the area of criminal law and kept abreast of
its development. Furthermore, statutory evolution demonstrates that the crim-
inal law, like the law generally, constantly changes and improves; that its object
is always the improvement of the administration of justice, looking both to pro-
tection of the individual's rights and to protection of the public from the criminal
offender. As Dean Roscoe Pound has said: "Raising up a body of lawyers, who
are to be advocates, prosecutors, and judges, with no thorough training in crim-
inal law, is nothing short of a threat to the administration of justice." 3
Professor Perkins, by his important work, has made a substantial contribution
toward the improvement of the criminal law and will interest many students in
this vital field. The basic philosophy of American justice, as spelled out in the
text, makes his book a volume every lawyer and student would be pleased to have.
EDwARD L. DowDt
3. See id. at vi.
t Lecturer in Criminal Law, St. Louis University School of Law; practicing
attorney, City of St. Louis; former Circuit Attorney, City of St. Louis.
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